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COMMENTS
Loopholes and Ambiguities of Section 2036
The possibility of divergent tax treatment of economically similar
situations has made section 2036 of the Internal Revenue Code' one
of the most abused of the federal estate tax provisions. Originally
enacted to ensure inclusion within the gross estate of the value of all
property ostensibly transferred by the decedent prior to his death and
yet beneficially enjoyed by him during his lifetime, 2 the section is
being circumvented by an increasing number of tax avoidance pat-
terns. Although some of the confusion can be traced to the erratic
approach of the courts to cases involving section 2036,3 the primary
interpretive difficulty stems from Congress' failure to define precisely
what it hoped to accomplish by the enactment of that section.4 Under
section 2036, the inter vivos gift of property in which the lifetime
income is reserved for the transferor is clearly includible in the gross
estate of the decedent-transferor. On the other hand, it is equally
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036: TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED LIFE ES-
TATE.
(a) GENERAL RuLE.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he
has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to
his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death-(I) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate
the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
(b) LIMITATIONS ON APPLICATION OF GENERAL RuLE This section shall not apply
to a transfer made before March 4, 1931; nor to a transfer made after March 3, 1931,
and before June 7, 1932, unless the property transferred would have been includible
in the decedent's gross estate by reason of the amendatory language of the joint
resolution of March 3, 1931 (46 Stat. 1516).
2. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 (1960); 3 MERTENS, FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION§ 24.06 (Supp. 1965). It has been remarked, however, that the section was meant to be
limited to a trust with a retained life estate. See Comment, The Construction of Section
2036, 60 MICH. L. Rav. 631, 636-57 (1962). For a review of the history of section 2036
see, e.g., BrrtR, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 1177-82 (3d ed. 1964);
LowNDas & KRAAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES §§ 8.1-.5 (2d ed. 1962); 8 MaRTENs,
op. cit. supra, § 24101 (Supp. 1965).
3. See Covey, Section 2036-The New Problem Child of the Federal Estate Tax,
4 TAx. CoUNs. Q. 121 (1960); Comment, 60 MICH. L. Rav. 631 (1962).
4. See 1 PAUL, FEDERL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION § 7.01 (1942), where the author
says:
The estate tax provisions dealing with transfers intended to take effect at death and
inter vivos trusts are probably the most esoteric provisions of the federal revenue
laws. It requires the most painstaking analysis to make any headway in under-
standing them; even today, after many years and attempts at clarification, few
would be bold enough to say they had mastered them. Bewildered administrative
authorities and puzzled courts have added words to words, but little meaning
emerges from the resulting thicket of obscurity.
Unfortunately, much of this statement remains true today. See BUrER, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 1177.
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clear that the transferor may accomplish the same economic result,
without subjecting the property to inclusion within his taxable estate
by virtue of section 2036, simply by dividing his property and giving
away an amount equal to the actuarial value of the remainder in-
terest while retaining an amount equal to the actuarial value of the
lifetime income. Taxation under section 2036 thus seems to turn on
the form utilized by the decedent in dividing and transferring his
property, rather than on the economic result. Unfortunately, most
of the tax avoidance patterns fall within the gray area between the
two forms of transfers mentioned above. A discussion of some of
these patterns may serve to focus attention on the need for a review
of the congressional purpose underlying section 2036 and for a pos-
sible statutory recasting of that section.
I. THE "TAx AvoIDANCE" PArrElqs
A. The Insurance-Annuity Combination
The insurance-annuity combination 5 furnishes a logical starting
point, for this device most clearly illustrates the dichotomy between
the taxable and the non-taxable forms of transfer. Under this plan, an
individual purchases a life insurance policy and concurrently pur-
chases a single premium, non-refundable annuity." Although the
annuity and insurance premiums are set at the normal rates, the size
of the annuity is calculated so that in the event the annuitant-insured
dies prematurely, the purchaser's "loss" from premature termination
of the annuity payments is offset by the gain resulting from early
realization of the full amount of the insurance policy.7 The insured
will have irrevocably assigned all of his rights in the insurance
policy to a beneficiary or a trustee, while retaining for himself the
annuity payments. In Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith,8 the
Supreme Court held that the value of the assigned policy was not
within the transferor's estate under section 2036.9 The Court viewed
5. See generally Friedman & Wheeler, The Insurance-Annuity Combination in
Estate Planning, Prac. Law., Oct. 1959, p. 48.
6. The person is often aged, infirm, or for some other reason uninsurable, but there
is no risk to the insurance company if the policies are purchased in combination.
7. For an extremely simplified example, assume that an individual with a life
expectancy of 15 years has $1,000,000 from which he now receives an annual income
of $35,000. He could purchase an annuity which would pay him $35,000 per year for
the rest of his life at a cost of $400,000. He could, at the same time, purchase
a single premium $1,000,000 life insurance policy at a cost of $600,000. In this way the
insured-annuitant receives $35,000 per year which is equal to the annual interest of
3V2% on $1,000,000 and on death, $1,000,000 is returned in the form of the life
insurance payment. From the point of view of the insurance company, $400,000 is the
amount necessary to produce $35,000 per year for 15 years assuming 32% compound
interest. Similarly, $600,000 is the present value of $1,000,000 due in 15 years also
assuming a compound interest rate of 3/27%. For purposes of simplification these
figures have been rounded off and the insurance company's normal "load" factor has
been ignored.
8. 356 U.S. 274 (1958), 56 MicH. L. RFv. 1366 (1958).
9. The Court resolved a conflict among several circuits. Conway v. Glenn, 193 F.2d
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the annuity and life insurance as two separate and distinct policies,
even though they were purchased in combination. 10 With this as the
Court's point of departure, it was easy to find that the prerequisite
for the application of section 2036-that a right be retained to in-
come from the transferred property-had not been fulfilled, since
the transferred property had been the insurance policy and the trans-
feror's retained annual income was produced by the separate annuity
policy." The three justices who dissented in Fidelity-Philadelphia
Trust thought that the majority had surrendered to a form over
substance approach. 1 They believed that the insurance and annuity
policies, when taken in combination, so closely resembled a transfer
in trust with retained lifetime income that section 2036 should
clearly have been applied. This conclusion is a realistic one, for when
the several components are viewed as a single transaction, the insured
has transferred a sum of money to the insurance company (which,
according to this theory, stands in the place of a "trustee"), has
retained a lifetime income, and has directed the "trustee" as to the
disposition of the remainder at the death of the insured. However, it
can be argued with equal facility that the insurance-annuity com-
bination resembles perhaps even more closely another type of trans-
fer which is at the tax-free end of the section 2036 taxable-nontaxable
spectrum. The transferor could have purchased an annuity and then
given a sum equal to the life insurance premium directly to the
proposed beneficiary. If insurance is the primary goal, and if this
intended beneficiary has an insurable interest in the life of the
transferor, the beneficiary, using the sum received, could purchase
the insurance policy himself. As an alternative, the beneficiary could
invest the sum received, and at the death of the transferor, the
amount of the principal plus the interest would perhaps equal or
even surpass the insurance proceeds payable under the insurance-
annuity combination. Neither of these alternatives would fall within
section 2036, since in neither did the transferor retain a right to in-
come from the transferred property. Thus, when viewed in light of
these various alternatives, the majority opinion in Fidelity-Phila-
delphia Trust Co. does not seem to be as great a surrender to form
over substance as the dissenting justices suggest.
Despite its high cost and relatively low investment yield, the
965 (6th Cir. 1952) and Burr v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 871 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 785 (1946), held the proceeds includable. On the other hand, Bohnen v. Harrison,
199 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1952), afl'd per curiam by equally divided court, 845 U.S. 946
(1953), held for the taxpayer.
10. The transferee of the life insurance policy could, after all, turn in that policy
for its cash surrender .value without in any way affecting the right of the annuitant to
receive his annual payments.
11. 356 U.S. at 280-81. After a seven-year wait, the Treasury acquiesced in the
holding in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust. See Rev. Rul. 69, 1965-1 Cum. BuLL. 440.
12. 356 U.S. at 281 (dissenting opinion). See The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72
HAv. L. R.v. 1366 (1958).
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insurance-annuity combination has been considered by some writers
as an important estate planning device.13 However, the Treasury,
although it acquiesced in the result of Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust
Co.,14 seems to view with suspicion any increased activity in the use
of this combination and has recently attacked one of the combina-
tion's main features in Revenue Ruling 65-57.1 This ruling provides
that the proceeds of the life insurance part of the combination shall
be treated as ordinary income to the recipient, although proceeds of
life insurance in non-combination contexts are normally excluded
from the recipient's gross income.' 6 The Treasury's position was
based on the holding in Helvering v. LeGierse17 that the elimination
of the risk of premature death in the calculation of the premiums for
an insurance-annuity combination indicates that there is no actual
"life insurance." Although this ruling has been subject to some
criticism,18 for the purposes of this discussion, it is significant to note
that the Treasury, which has been unable to attack directly the
insurance-annuity combination, has invoked the income tax sections
of the Code in order to lessen the combination's desirability as an
estate plan. Thus, it appears that if the insurance-annuity combina-
tion is to be subject to federal estate tax consequences, new legisla-
tion will be needed.' 9 However, Congress will then need to decide to
what extent it wishes to restrict the use of the currently tax-free
13. The advantages of the insurance-annuity combination are spelled out in Fried-
man & Wheeler, supra note 5, at 64:
The Insurance-Annuity Combination permits planning with precision. . ..[The insured-annuitant knows the amount by which his estate is reduced, the
amount which his beneficiary will receive and the amount which he will receive
each year;]
The Insurance-Annuity Combination enables the donor to make a larger gift of
insurance than he would otherwise make, because he will have the security afforded
by the retained annuity.
The Insurance-Annuity Combination is simple in its operation....
The Insurance-Annuity Combination is the only method by which an uninsur-
able person may obtain life insurance ....
See also Friedman & Wheeler, Life Insurance Policies as the Subject of Gifts: Outright
or in Trust, N.Y.U. 22D INST. ON FED. TAX. 1323, 1335-36 (1964).
14. See note 11 supra.
15. Rev. Rul. 57, 1965-1 CUM. BuLL. 56.
16. If paid by reason of the death of the insured, the proceeds of a life insurance
contract are generally excluded from the gross income of the recipient. INT. REv. CODE
or 1954, § 101(a).
17. 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
18. See Schlesinger, New Revenue Rulings on Annuity-Insurance Combinations Pose
Fresh Tax Dangers, 104 TRusTs & ESTATES 344 (1965). Prior to Rev. Rul. 65-57, it had
been assumed by some writers that the proceeds would be free from the income tax.
See Friedman & Wheeler, Life Insurance Policies as the Subject of Gifts: Outright or
in Trust, N.Y.U. 22D INST. ON FED. TAX. 1323, 1335 n.36 (1964); Friedman & Wheeler,
The Insurance-Annuity Combination in Estate Planning, Prac. Law., Oct. 1959,
pp. 53-54.
19. LowNDss & KIRAMR, op. cit. supra note 2, § 13.11, at 290: "[W]hen considered
in relation to the overall backdrop of section 2036, it becomes apparent that the Court
has given to insurance companies a device which, if effectively exploited, can virtually
emasculate that section of the code." See Note, 56 MicH. L. R v. 1366, 1370 (1958).
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alternatives and it must recognize that the insurance-annuity com-
bination is only one phase of the problem.
B. Joint Tenancy Transfers
A second method which is used to avoid the consequences of
section 2036 is the joint tenancy transfer. The implementation of this
plan is somewhat more complex than the insurance-annuity combina-
tion and often requires the cooperation of a second party. Generally,
a husband will purchase property in, or convert presently held
property to, the name of his wife and himself as joint tenants. If the
husband were to die immediately after such a purchase or conversion,
section 204020 requires that, if the wife had not supplied any of the
consideration for the property, the entire value of the jointly held
property be included in his gross estate. However, prior to the
husband's death, the couple may convey the jointly held property to
their children, with each parent retaining a life estate in half of the
property. Such a conveyance effects a severance of the jointly held
property, and consequently takes it out of the scope of section 2040.
In this context, the courts have held that at the husband's death,
section 2036 requires that only one-half of the original property be
included in his gross estate,21 since the husband conveyed to his
children only his interest in the property, which at the time of the
conveyance was an undivided one-half interest, and he retained the
life benefits only from the part conveyed.22 A variation of this same
tax-avoidance plan is that after a severance of the joint tenancy,
either tenant could convey the actuarial equivalent of the remainder
interest in the property, while retaining the equivalent of the lifetime
income. This disposition, like the same disposition by the insurance-
annuity transferor, would not result in any section 2036 conse-
quences.
The significance of the joint-tenancy transfer becomes immedi-
ately apparent when its resulting tax consequences are compared with
those which would have occurred had the husband and wife retained
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2040.
21. See, e.g., Glaser v. United States, 306 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1962); Heasty v. United
States, 239 F. Supp. 345 (D. Kan. 1965). Other cases have held that a transfer of a joint
tenancy interest in contemplation of death required the inclusion of only the one-half
interest in the transferor's gross estate, even if the transferor had contributed the full
consideration toward the acquisition of the jointly held property. See, e.g., Sullivan's
Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949); Estate of A. Carl Borner, 25
T.C. 584 (1955), nonacq., 1962-1 Cum. BULL. 4; Estate of Brockway, 18 T.C. 488, 499
(1952), aff'd on other grounds, 219 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1954). See generally Wright,
Transfers of Joint Property in Contemplation of Death-A Call for Immediate Statu-
tory Revision, 55 MIcH. L. R y. 1 (1956).
22. See Glaser v. United States, 306 F.2d 57, 60-61 (7th Cir. 1962); Heasty v. United
States, 239 F. Supp. 345 (D. Kan. 1965). See generally Comment, Problems of Estate and
Gift Taxation of Joint Ownership Interests, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Ra,. 1205 (1963).
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the property as joint tenants until the husband's death. Section 2040
reflects a congressional policy decision that the owner of property
should not be able to escape estate taxation merely by conveying the
property to another and himself as joint tenants. It would seem
initially that the tax-wary joint tenant should not be allowed to avoid
the effect of section 2040 simply by conveying, with his wife's coopera-
tion, the jointly held property to their children while retaining life
estates. However, joint tenancies are severable by the unilateral
action of either party,2 3 and it would seem to be very harsh to in-
clude the value of the entire property in an individual's estate if he
had conveyed his half of the property to his children, retaining a life
estate, after an involuntary severance. 24 Furthermore, the utility of
the joint tenancy transfer as an estate plan is somewhat doubtful,
particularly since the same economic result could be obtained by the
creation of a tenancy in common or by an outright gift of one-half of
the property by the husband to the wife, either of which dispositions
of the property would avoid any section 2040 difficulties.
C. Non-Retention Transfers
Another pattern, several variations of which have enjoyed recent
popularity, may be labeled the "non-retention" plans. Section 2036
provides that the transferred property is to be included in the dece-
dent's gross estate only if he retains either the "possession or enjoy-
ment of, or the right to income from, the transferred property."25 In
an illustrative case,26 decedent had transferred nearly all of her prop-
erty to her sister, who in turn promised to care for the decedent for
the rest of her life. The Commissioner, analogizing the transaction to
a transfer to a trust with income retained for life, included the value
of the transferred property in the decedent's gross estate. The analogy
failed, however, because of the transferee-sister's unfettered ability to
dispose of the transferred property as she saw fit. The court drew a
distinction between a transfer with retained enjoyment of the prop-
erty transferred, and a transfer in exchange for services which may,
but need not necessarily, be financed by the transferred property.27
Another instance in which a court adhered to this distinction in-
volved a trust, the corpus of which was to provide, upon liquidation,
the funds to purchase $10,000 annuities for its beneficiaries.28 Prior
to the liquidation and purchase of the annuities, the beneficiaries
were to receive annual payments from the trust equal to the proposed
23. See Polasky, Current Tax Developments Including Joint Tenancy and Widow's
Election, 103 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 253, 254-55 (1964).
24. It should be noted that in the case of tenancy by the entirety, no severance is
possible without the concurrence of both parties. Polasky, supra note 23, at 254.
25. See statute quoted note 1 supra.
26. Estate of Sarah A. Bergan, 1 T.C. 543 (1943).
27. Id. at 552.
28. Becklenberg's Estate v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1959).
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annuity proceeds. When a contributor of property to the trust, who
was also a beneficiary, died before the annuities were purchased, the
Commissioner argued that her contribution to the corpus should
be included in her gross estate because the annual payments she had
received from the trust amounted to a retention -of the right to in-
come from the transferred property.29 The court, rejecting this con-
tention, pointed out that she had simply purchased a contract pur-
suant to which the trust was to pay her $10,000 a year and that her
right to the annual payments was not limited to the property trans-
ferred by her or the income therefrom.30
Another popular "non-retention" plan involves a husband, who
owns his home and who transfers title in the home to his wife,
ostensibly in fee with no strings attached, and a wife who very
graciously allows her husband to continue to live in the house once
she has title. This would seem to be the classic case for illustrating
the "enjoyment or possession" language of section 2036, for the
legislative history of that section indicates that Congress included the
words "possession or enjoyment" in addition to the words "right to
income" for the primary purpose of bringing such non-income pro-
ducing property as a family home within the section.3' Nevertheless,
the courts have consistently demanded proof of at least an implied
agreement between the husband and wife before they will say that
the husband has "retained" enjoyment or possession so as to require
the inclusion of the value of the house in his gross estate.3 2 Although
some courts are less reluctant than others to imply an agreement in
this situation,33 there is still the possibility of a substantial premium
to those husbands who, because of their particularly harmonious
marital relationships, are assured that they will be able to continue to
enjoy the transferred property without having to extract an agree-
ment from their transferee-wives.3 4 What the courts fail to consider,
however, is that section 2036 does not require that the transferor
retain a legal right to the possession or enjoyment of the transferred
29. The applicable section was INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 811(c), 53 Stat. 120, the
predecessor of IN. Rev. CODE OF 1954, § 2036.
30. 273 F.2d at 801. Some of the payments to decedent had been made from the
corpus of the trust. Ibid. The reasoning of the Becklenberg court has been criticized in
Covey, supra note 3, at 132-37.
31. See H.R. REP. No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1949); Covey, supra note 3, at
129-30.
32. See, e.g., Stephenson v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Va. 1965); Union
Planters Natl Bank v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Tenn. 1964), which cite
and rely on Markovits, The Fate of Inter Vivos Transfers Under Internal Revenue
Code Section 2036, 7 TAx COONS. Q. 395 (1963). See also Clark v. United States, 209 F.
Supp. 895 (D. Colo. 1962).
33. An implied contract was found in Estate of Skinner v. United States, 316 F.2d
517, 520 (3d Cir. 1963); Peck v. United States, 16 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6125 (M.D. Ga.
1965).
84. A more difficult situation might be presented if the husband transferred the
money to his wife and the wife subsequently used the money to purchase the house in
her name.
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property. It has been held, for example, that section 2036 was ap-
plicable when transferees gave the dividend income from transferred
securities to their transferor-father, even though the father did not
have a legal right to the dividends since the transferees' obligations
to give the dividends to their father were pursuant to an oral and
unenforceable agreement.85 The foregoing suggests that Congress, in
making any revision in section 2036, should make clear its intention
that transferred property be considered part of the transferor's gross
estate for estate tax purposes when the transferor does in fact retain
the benefit of the property which he has ostensibly transferred com-
pletely.
D. Inter Vivos Transfers of Retained Life Estates
Another procedure by which it is possible to avoid the effect of
section 2036 is by transferring property with a reserved life estate, and
subsequently making an inter vivos transfer of the retained estate.36
However, the now famous case of United States v. Allen 37 indicates
that there may be some danger in attempting to avoid estate taxation
in this manner. In Allen, decedent had established an irrevocable
trust, reserving a portion of the income to herself for life. Upon being
informed that the retention of the life estate would cause the corpus
of the trust to be included in her estate, she sold the life estate to her
son for a price slightly in excess of its actuarial value. She died a short
time later, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that since
the life estate was transferred without full consideration and in con-
templation of death, it was not an effective transfer of the decedent's
retained interest in the corpus of the trust, so that section 2036
required the inclusion of the corpus in the decedent's gross estate.88
With respect to the question of adequate consideration, the court
made the rather surprising pronouncement that the fair market value
of the life estate was not sufficient consideration for a transfer of this
kind; indeed, in order to remove the transferred property from the
consequences of section 2036, the court stated that the consideration
must equal the commuted value of both the life estate and the re-
mainder. 9 Since the court was willing to concede that it was ridicu-
lous to expect that anyone would ever pay this amount, its statement
35. Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959); see Covey,
supra note 3, at 131.
36. However, it seems that the Treasury may argue that a transfer of the retained
life estate for its then value is an "anticipatory realization of income from the life
estate." See Polasky, Current Tax Developments Including Joint Tenancy and Widow's
Election, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 253 (1964).
37. 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1961). See Lowndes & Stephens, Identification of
Property Subject to the Federal Estate Tax, 65 MicH. L. REv. 105, 120-25 (1966).
38. 293 F.2d at 918. Since the decedent died prior to the adoption of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code, the applicable statutory provision was INT. RE v. CoDE oF 1939,
§ 811, 53 Stat. 120.
39. 293 F.2d at 918. This rationale has been criticized in Zissman, Problem Areas
in the Estate Tax, 41 TAxEs 875 (1963).
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suggests that it will be difficult if not impossible, for an individual to
escape the consequences of section 2036 by selling a life estate which
he has purposely or unwittingly retained under a previous transfer. 40
The concurring judge in Allen went so far as to state:
As I read [section 2036] the tax liability arises at the time of the
inter vivos transfer under which there was a retention of the
right to income for life. The disposition thereafter of that
retained right does not eliminate the taxability.41
The result in Allen, however, is practically mandatory if section
2036 is to be preserved, at least in its present form. If a contrary result
had been reached, every life estate retained in a previous transfer
would be transferred by its holder on his death-bed, for its value at
that time, with the result that only the then nominal value of the life
estate would be pulled back into the donor's estate under the provi-
sion of the Code which treats gifts in contemplation of death.42
II. CONSIDERATIONS IN FORMULATING A VIABLE REPLACEMENT
It is admittedly far easier to condemn than to correct. Any re-
evaluation of the congressional position on the taxation of estates
will necessarily involve numerous factors and should reach beyond
the mere correction of section 2036.43 The initial step is to determine
the function which the Congress expects the estate tax to serve in
the tax system; such a determination will play an integral role in
deciding the scope of possible revision.
A. The Elimination of the Estate Tax
The estate tax is essentially a device of social control; 44 its pri-
mary aim is to make the accumulation of huge family fortunes more
difficult. The revenue it produces is relatively small,4 5 which would
40. 293 F.2d at 917; see Brown, The Allen Case and the Widow's Election, 36 So.
CAL. L. REv. 229, 286 (1963).
41. 293 F.2d at 918 (concurring opinion). Fortunately, this view has not been
adopted. However, the literal language of the statute does firmly support this position.
See LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND G 'r TAXFs § 8.13 (2d ed. 1962).
42. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035.
43. The fact that § 2036 overlaps with other federal estate tax provisions has also
contributed to the confusion surrounding the section. For example, it has been argued
that § 2037 would cover nearly all of the cases which fall within § 2036. ALI, FEDERAL
INCOME, ESTATE AND GiFr TAX STATUTE 177 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1955); see Lowndes &
Stephens, Identification of Property Subject to the Federal Estate Tax, 65 MicH. L. REv.
105, 112-13 (1966). Some of the powers which are treated under § 2038 may also
come within the language of § 2036 although the two sections provide different
tax consequences. Such inconsistent treatment has no place in estate taxation. See
LEwis, THE ESTATE TAx 63-66 (1960); LOWNDEs & KRAMER, FEDERAl. ESTATE AND GIFT
TAxs § 9.14 (2d ed. 1962); Pedrick, Grantor Powers and Estate Taxation: The Ties
That Bind, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 527, 545 (1959).
44. See Lowndes, Common Sense Correlation of the Estate and Gift Taxes, 17 U.
FLA. L. REv. 507, 508 (1965).
45. See WARREN & SuRaEy, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAxATiON 10 (1961 ed.), where
it is indicated that these taxes produce about 2% of the federal tax revenues.
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indicate that if the estate tax were eliminated, the decrease in
revenue could be off-set by the other revenue producing sections of
the Code. There is, however, little indication that the Congress
would take steps which would drastically modify the estate tax.
Thus, possible changes, if any, will probably be aimed at correcting
existing "loopholes."
B. Retention of the Estate Tax-Corrective Considerations
If the trend of the past few years is indicative of future activity,
the major thrust of changes in the estate tax provisions of the Code
will not be limited to one or two sections alone. Rather, by means
of a sweeping overhaul of the federal tax system, 46 such as the recently
proposed Unified Transfer Tax,47 draftsmen will seek to establish a
heretofore non-existent correlation among the gift and estate tax, and
possibly even the income tax, sections of the Code.48 If the purpose
of section 2036 is to be preserved in such a revision, a careful con-
sideration of the wording of that section will be necessary.
Section 2036, as presently worded, imposes estate tax conse-
quences on one form of transfer, whereas a second form, which in
most cases accomplishes the same economic result, is not affected.
The drafters of new estate tax legislation must recognize that a given
amount of property is capable of being divided in many ways, both
legally and physically. At the present time, section 2036 affects only
the legal division of property into a life estate and a remainder; the
wording does not cover the physical division of the same property
into the actuarial equivalent of a life estate and the actuarial equiva-
lent of a remainder. Unless there are policy reasons for distinguishing
between these types of divisions, a difference in tax treatment is not
justified where the economic result is essentially the same.
James C. Ervin, Jr.
46. Perhaps the impetus for such a sweeping change was provided by the admoni-
tion:
We have been like Englishmen who never clean their slates; no language could be
thrown away if anyone thought in optimistic vein that he understood its meaning.
Amendments consisted of addition, duplication and overlapping. No one suggested
the heroic remedy of fresh language which would dear away the debris and say
simply what was plainly dictated by disillusioning experience with a statute that
had repeatedly failed to say what the Treasury, at least, thought it meant. It was
easier to repair at damaged points in a makeshift way, always hoping for a dim
best. Some day we shall learn that sound revenue laws are not made in such a
piecemeal way, and that postponing such important problems may be an expensive
luxury.
I PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND G=rT TAXATION § 7.01 (1942).
47. ALl, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAX PROJECT (Study Draft No. 1, 1965).
48. See Lowndes, Common Sense Correlation of Gift and Estate Tax, 17 U. FLA. L.
REv. 507, 507-12 (1965) (offering an alternative correlation, insofar as § 2036 would be
affected, at 518-20); ALl FED. INCOME, ESTATE & GiFT TAX STAT. (Tent. Draft Nos. 9,
1954; 10, 1955).
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